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Note 
 
It Can Do More Than Protect Your Credit Score: 
Regulating Social Media Pre-Employment 
Screening with the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
Nathan J. Ebnet∗
Landing that great new job just got a little bit harder. In 
addition to written applications, lengthy interviews, and com-
prehensive criminal and credit checks, a growing number of 
employers are factoring job candidates’ social media profiles in-
to their hiring decisions.
 
1 Even in 2006, roughly thirty-five per-
cent of employers eliminated job candidates based on infor-
mation discovered online.2 And although it should come as no 
surprise that more obscene social media content, such as sex-
ually explicit photos or racist remarks, could damage an indi-
vidual’s job prospects, so too could a long-forgotten blog post or 
a heated political discussion with a friend.3 After all, only a few 
clicks separate a staggering amount of personal data—
conveniently preserved online—from a curious employer.4
Despite the increasing popularity of social media pre-
employment screening, whether or not such a practice is legal 
  
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2009, 
Gustavus Adolphus College. The author would like to give special thanks to 
Professor Stephen Befort for his invaluable assistance throughout the writing 
process. Many thanks also to the hardworking editors and staff members of 
the Minnesota Law Review. Above all, the author expresses gratitude to his 
family and friends. Copyright © 2012 by Nathan J. Ebnet. 
 1. See Jennifer Preston, Social Media History Becomes a New Job Hur-
dle, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2011, at B1.  
 2. NBC Nightly News: Profile: College Students Using New Web Site 
Could Have Their Personal Information Read by Prospective Employers (NBC 
television broadcast May 13, 2006) (transcript available at 2006 WLNR 
8296767). 
 3. See Ian Byrnside, Note, Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifica-
tions of Employers Using Social Networking Sites to Research Applicants, 10 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 445, 446 (2008) (contrasting information regarding a 
user’s favorite band or movie to posts that feature a person’s sexual escapades 
and substance abuse).  
 4. See id. at 455–56. 
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or appropriate is a subject of disagreement.5 Many employers 
applaud social media pre-employment screening because it al-
lows them to gather as much information as possible about job 
applicants, making it easier to predict the likely match between 
the applicant and the job.6 On the other hand, some commenta-
tors argue that employers should be wary of using social media 
to evaluate job candidates.7 Citing concerns over the trustwor-
thiness and authenticity of information obtained from the In-
ternet,8 along with the potential for its abuse,9 privacy experts 
encourage employers to look elsewhere for applicant data.10
Sharp disagreement over the legality of social media pre-
employment screening persists because the accessibility of so-
cial media challenges the regulatory framework governing tra-
ditional pre-employment screening practices.
 
11 For example, the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which contains notice and 
consent requirements for a wide variety of background checks 
that are particularly relevant to the social media pre-
employment screening context, only applies to those back-
ground checks conducted by third-party screening companies.12
 
 5. See id. at 458 (“Many employment attorneys believe there is nothing 
illegal about employers using social networking sites to uncover additional in-
formation about applicants.”). 
 
Since most employers obtain and view an applicant’s social me-
 6. See id. (“[E]mployers believe they have the right to obtain as much in-
formation as possible about applicants and that using social networking sites 
‘is fair game to find out who will be the ‘best fit’ for their organization.’” (quot-
ing Hiring: Pitfalls of Checking Job Applicants’ Personal Web Pages, MANAG-
ING ACCOUNTS PAYABLE, Oct. 2006, at 5)). 
 7. See, e.g., Rachel Slagle, Approach Social Media Sites with Caution in 
the Pre-Employment Screening Process, INSPERITY (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www 
.insperity.com/blog/article/approach-social-media-sites-with-caution-in-the-pre 
-employment-screening-proces/. 
 8. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 476 (“[E]mployers should remember 
that an applicant’s online persona does not always provide an accurate, relia-
ble, or complete picture of the person.”). 
 9. For a discussion of discrimination in the hiring process, see Stephen F. 
Befort, Pre-Employment Screening and Investigation: Navigating Between a 
Rock and a Hard Place, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 365, 381 (1997). 
 10. See Carolyn Elefant, Do Employers Using Facebook for Background 
Checks Face Legal Risks?, LAW.COM LEGAL BLOG WATCH (Mar. 11, 2008, 3:45 
PM), http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/2008/03/do-employers-us 
.html (“I think it’s unlikely employers are going to learn a good deal of job-
related information from a Facebook page they won’t learn in the context of a 
well-run interview, so the potential benefit of doing this sort of search is out-
weighed by the potential risk.”).  
 11. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 458–59. 
 12. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (2006). 
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dia information from a work or personal computer without the 
assistance of a third-party screening company, this type of in-
formal research escapes the restrictions of the FCRA and many 
other regulations designed to protect an applicant’s privacy.13
However, just like so many other aspects of the Internet, 
social media pre-employment screening is evolving.
 
14 With ac-
quiescence from the federal government,15 several start-up 
companies now offer to research job candidates’ online activi-
ties for employers. Boasting of a superior method of social me-
dia research, these start-up companies hope to persuade em-
ployers to abandon “in-house” social media screening in favor of 
a formal third-party report.16 Consider Social Intelligence, a 
company founded in 2010 in Santa Barbara, California.17 It 
scours the Internet for everything job applicants may have said 
or done online in the past seven years and then provides em-
ployers a specialized social media report detailing an appli-
cant’s online activity.18 When social media pre-employment 
screening is performed by third parties like Social Intelligence, 
it must be FCRA compliant.19 Yet employers remain free to 
avoid the restrictions of the FCRA by simply conducting in-
house online research rather than contracting with third par-
ties.20
This Note argues that FCRA compliant third-party social 
media screening appropriately balances the privacy interests of 
job applicants with the information appetite of employers. Part 
I describes traditional applicant screening strategies, how they 
are regulated, and the distinctive privacy interests threatened 
by employers’ informal use of social media during the hiring 
process. Part II analyzes the utility and application of existing 
regulatory methods to social media background checks. Finally, 
 This problematic loophole highlights the need for further 
analysis in this emerging area of the law.  
 
 13. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 459 (noting that social media has in-
creased the amount of applicant information “that is readily available to and 
easily accessible by employers”). 
 14. See Preston, supra note 1, at B1. 
 15. See Letter from Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Privacy & Iden-
tity Prot., Bureau of Consumer Prot., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Renee Jackson, 
Esq., Nixon Peabody LLP (May 9, 2011), available at www.ftc.gov/os/ 
closings/110509social-intelligenceletter.pdf. 
 16. See Preston, supra note 1, at B1. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Mithal, supra note 15, at 2. 
 20. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 465.  
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Part III contends that the FCRA is uniquely suited to address 
the legal problems arising from social media use in the hiring 
arena. Therefore, this Note recommends that all social media 
screening should be formalized—by requiring employers to hire 
third-party companies to perform social media research and 
submit to the FCRA, employers will obtain reliable applicant 
information and respect candidate privacy. 
I.  EMPLOYERS’ PRE-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING 
PRACTICES: THEN AND NOW   
In today’s hyper-competitive market,21 employers likely 
have the luxury of choosing from many highly qualified appli-
cants for any particular job opening.22 Still, employers routinely 
“screen in” applicants who possess desirable characteristics and 
“screen out” applicants with negative traits.23 Ultimately, they 
try to find applicants with qualities that will maximize work 
productivity and minimize costs and liability.24
To aid in this search, employers use an assortment of fa-
miliar pre-employment screening practices, including inter-
views and background checks.
  
25 But due to the likelihood that 
even seemingly benign screening activities will go too far, tradi-
tional pre-employment screening is subject to a variety of legal 
restrictions that attempt to protect applicants from an overly 
intrusive hiring experience.26 New technologies threaten this 
regulatory landscape.27
 
 21. The national jobless rate for the United States during January 2012 
was 8.3 percent. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment Sit-
uation—January 2012 (Feb. 3, 2012), available at 
 Specifically, the advent of social media 
offers employers convenient access to previously unobtainable 
http://www.bls.gov/news 
.release/archives/empsit_02032012.pdf. 
 22. See Catherine Rampell, Many with New College Degree Find the Job 
Market Humbling, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2011, at A1 (stating that about only 
half of the jobs landed by new college graduates require a college degree). 
 23. See Ann Marie Ryan & Marja Lasek, Negligent Hiring and Defama-
tion: Areas of Liability Related to Pre-Employment Inquiries, 44 PERSONNEL 
PSYCHOL. 293, 304 (1991).  
 24. Byrnside, supra note 3, at 448; see also JOSEPH ZEIDNER & CECIL D. 
JOHNSON, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PREDICTING JOB PERFORMANCE, VOL. 
I: SELECTION UTILITY 143 (1991) (positing that pre-employment “[t]esting can 
save [employers] money because employees selected by valid tests are more 
productive than those selected by other methods”). 
 25. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 448.  
 26. See id. at 379–80. 
 27. See id. at 370–71 (suggesting that technological advances are likely to 
continue to provide employers with new and sophisticated screening  
technology).  
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applicant information.28
A. THE LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON TRADITIONAL PRE-
EMPLOYMENT SCREENING 
 Employers are implementing this pow-
erful new hiring tool, justifying an examination of social media 
pre-employment screening. 
Historically, employers relied on written applications, 
questionnaires, interviews, references and background checks 
to screen job applicants.29 These practices were presumed per-
missible, limited only by certain exceptions designed to pre-
serve the privacy of job candidates.30 If an employer appropri-
ately balanced the prospective employee’s right to privacy with 
the employer’s own right to hire a qualified individual, the pre-
employment screen was reasonable.31 However, within recent 
years, even traditional pre-employment screening practices 
have received heightened judicial and legislative scrutiny.32 In 
particular, traditional pre-employment research is subject to 
the anti-discrimination constraints of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA), state statutes regarding arrest records, the re-
porting restrictions of the FCRA, and the privacy protections 
contained in the Fourth Amendment.33
1. Title VII and the ADA 
 
Title VII, the main federal anti-discrimination statute, for-
bids employers from discriminating against applicants based on 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.34
 
 28. See Byrnside, supra note 
 Critically, Title 
VII does not prohibit application procedures that elicit infor-
mation concerning a protected class as long as employment de-
cisions are grounded in legitimate, non-discriminatory mo-
3, at 446–47 (“[P]rospective employers are 
becoming increasingly aware of [social networking] sites and are taking ad-
vantage of the massive amount of newly available information to assist them 
in them in their hiring decisions.”). 
 29. See generally Rochelle B. Ecker, Comment, To Catch a Thief: The Pri-
vate Employer’s Guide to Getting and Keeping an Honest Employee, 63 UMKC 
L. REV. 251, 255–61 (1994) (describing traditional methods of pre-employment 
screening). 
 30. LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT SCREENING § 9.01 (1992). 
 31. Ecker, supra note 29, at 254–55. 
 32. See Befort, supra note 9, at 366. 
 33. See id. at 381.  
 34. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e-17 (2006). 
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tives.35 Guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) state that interview questions 
that either directly or indirectly require the disclosure of in-
formation concerning protected class status may constitute evi-
dence of discrimination.36
 Similarly, the ADA prohibits discriminatory hiring against 
individuals with a disability who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the em-
ployment position.
 
37 But the ADA goes a step further than Title 
VII: it actually prohibits employers from inquiring about the 
existence, nature, or severity of a disability even if the respons-
es are not used in making an employment decision.38 As a gen-
eral rule, employers may investigate an applicant’s abilities but 
may not seek information concerning impairment status.39
It is important to note that state statutes frequently sup-
plement Title VII and the ADA.
  
40 In Minnesota, for example, 
state law prohibits pre-employment inquiries concerning race, 
religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, age, creed, marital 
status, disability, status with regard to public assistance, and 
sexual orientation.41 And so long as state laws provide equiva-
lent or greater protection against discrimination, they are not 
preempted by federal law.42 Yet the fairness guidelines imposed 
by Title VII, the ADA, and relevant state statutes are primarily 
limited to interview questions, questionnaires, and reference 
checks.43
2. State Statutes Regulating Applicants’ Arrest Records 
 This has led state legislatures to create additional 
rules to constrain other pre-employment screening practices. 
In addition to self-reported information obtained through 
interviews, questionnaires, and references, employers often 
 
 35. See Befort, supra note 9, at 381 (citing Bruno v. City of Crown Point, 
950 F.2d 355, 363–65 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
 36. See id. at 382 (citing EEOC, Guide to Pre-Employment Inquiries, 8A 
Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 443:65–66 (1992)). Although EEOC guidelines 
do not have the force of law, courts generally give them considerable defer-
ence. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1997). 
 37. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2006). 
 38. See Befort, supra note 9, at 383. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West 2011); MINN. STAT. § 363A 
(2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2011). 
 41. MINN. STAT. § 363A.08, subd. 4(a)(1) (2011). 
 42. Befort, supra note 9, at 386. 
 43. See id. at 381–86. 
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conduct background checks to gather information on an appli-
cant’s criminal record.44 Criminal background checks are usual-
ly permissible if employment decisions based on an applicant’s 
criminal record are consistent with a business necessity and do 
not have a disparate impact on a certain class of applicants.45 A 
number of states have also restricted or prohibited the use of 
arrest records, but not conviction records, in criminal back-
ground checks.46 Because arrests do not necessarily establish 
guilt, these state statutes aim to avoid disparate impact prob-
lems while preventing the penalization of persons not subse-
quently charged with a crime for which they were arrested.47 
But since Title VII and the ADA provide the theoretical support 
for state restrictions on arrest records in the hiring context,48 
states have been reluctant to expand restrictions on pre-
employment screening beyond criminal background checks. 
However, some states restrict employers’ ability to look at other 
types of public records.49
3. The FCRA and Credit Scores 
  
Many employers also screen applicants by examining cred-
it reports compiled by consumer credit reporting agencies.50
 
 44. See id. at 404–06.  
 Us-
ing statistical formulas that reflect an individual’s bill-paying 
history, including late collection actions, consumer credit re-
 45. See id. at 404–05. 
 46. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7 (West 2011); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/2-103 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2205a (West 2011); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-I:51 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.050 (2011); WIS. STAT. 
§ 111.335 (2011). See generally Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Pub-
lic Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1169 (2002) 
(“Confronted with increased information trade, some states have attempted to 
restrict access to personal information in public records as well as certain uses 
of personal information obtained from public records.”).  
 47. See Ecker, supra note 29, at 255–56. 
 48. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971) (holding 
that otherwise neutral selection devices that have a disparate impact on pro-
tected classes may violate Title VII). 
 49. See Solove, supra note 46, at 1169–70. 
 50. See Ecker, supra note 29, at 257. A survey released by the Society for 
Human Resource Management reveals that forty-seven percent of employers 
admit to using credit checks for certain job applicants. Background Checking: 
Conducting Credit Checks, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (Jan. 22, 2010), 
http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Pages/BackgroundChe
cking.aspx. 
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porting agencies generate a credit score.51 Next, these third-
party reporting companies sell the relevant credit reports to in-
terested employers who demonstrate a legitimate business 
need for the information.52 Employers may view an applicant’s 
credit score as a proxy for trustworthiness, since higher credit 
scores are associated with creditworthiness and an ability to 
meet one’s obligations.53
Thus, to avoid liability during the credit reporting process, 
both the employer and the third-party consumer credit report-
ing agency must comply with the FCRA. In 1970, Congress 
passed the FCRA to “require that consumer reporting agencies 
adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce 
for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other infor-
mation in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consum-
er, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and 
proper utilization of such information . . . .”
  
54 The FCRA gives 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) the primary administra-
tive authority to enforce the provision of the FCRA.55 According 
to the FTC, the FCRA is “intended to ensure that this country’s 
consumer reporting system would function fairly, accurately, 
and efficiently, without needless intrusion into consumer priva-
cy.”56 Courts generally agree that the purpose of the FCRA is to 
ensure accuracy in reports affecting an individual’s eligibility 
for credit, insurance, or employment.57
The FCRA makes clear that applicants must give permis-
sion to an employer before a credit report is initiated,
 
58
 
 51. See Building a Better Credit Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 3 (Aug. 
2011), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/cre03.pdf. 
 and that 
notice must be given to applicants if an adverse decision results 
 52. See id. at 1.  
 53. See id. at 3 (“[A credit score] helps predict . . . how likely it is that [a 
person] will repay a loan and make the payments on time.”).  
 54. H.R. REP. No. 91-1587, at 16 (1970). 
 55. See Amanda L. Fuchs, Comment, The Absurdity of the FTC’s Interpre-
tation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s Application to Workplace Investiga-
tions: Why Courts Should Look Instead to the Legislative History, 96 NW. U. L. 
REV. 339, 341 (2001). 
 56. Fair Credit Reporting Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer 
Affairs and Coinage of the Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 102d 
Cong. 20 (1991) (statement of David Medine, Associate Director for Credit 
Practices, Federal Trade Commission). 
 57. See, e.g., D’Angelo v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., 515 F. Supp. 1250, 1253 
(D. Del. 1981); Porter v. Talbot Perkins Children’s Servs., 355 F. Supp. 174, 
176 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (citing 116 CONG. REC. 36,572 (1970)). 
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) (2006). 
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from the credit report.59 Moreover, the consumer reporting 
agency, following a consumer’s request, must disclose the in-
formation that it maintains in the consumer’s file.60 Violators of 
the FCRA can be sued for actual damages and, in some cases, 
punitive damages.61
Importantly, the FCRA only applies to “consumer re-
port[s]” prepared by “consumer reporting agenc[ies].”
  
62
[A]ny written, oral, or other communication of any information by a 
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s . . . character, 
general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which 
is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the 
purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibil-
ity for . . . employment purposes.
 “Con-
sumer report” is defined as: 
63
The FCRA defines a “consumer reporting agency” as any 
individual or business that “regularly engages in whole or in 
part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer cred-
it information or other information on consumers for the pur-
pose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties . . . .”
 
64 
Based on these broad statutory definitions, the FCRA applies to 
more than simply credit reports; other types of background 
checks are subject to the FCRA.65
4. The Fourth Amendment 
 However, the statutory lan-
guage noticeably fails to include informal research, performed 
without third-party assistance, from FCRA regulation.  
A final constraint, specifically on government employers’ 
pre-employment screening practices, is found in the Fourth 
Amendment. Many job applicants worry that pre-employment 
background checks—whether criminal, credit, or otherwise—
are an invasion of privacy in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.66
 
 59. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (2006); Ecker, supra note 
 Consequently, privacy in the workplace, including the 
29, at 258. 
 60. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) (2006).  
 61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n–1681o (2006). 
 62. Id. 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2006). 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(f ) (2006). 
 65. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 465. 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated.”).  
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off-duty activity of job applicants, is garnering increased legal 
attention.67
Historically, Fourth Amendment violations were tied to 
property invasions by law enforcement.
  
68 But modern courts 
have expanded Fourth Amendment rights to protect reasonable 
expectations of privacy, following Katz v. United States.69 Ac-
cordingly, job applicants frequently argue that pre-employment 
screening is an invasion of privacy.70 Yet much of the infor-
mation gathered by employers through traditional pre-
employment screening tools is publically available, and the 
Fourth Amendment only applies to certain kinds of governmen-
tal intrusions, which severely limits the Fourth Amendment’s 
application to pre-employment screening.71 Nevertheless, the 
Fourth Amendment legitimizes an expectation of privacy in 
some circumstances.72
Title VII, the ADA, state statutes, the FCRA, and the 
Fourth Amendment provide a legal framework for traditional 
pre-employment screening practices. However, this regulatory 
structure is being challenged by social media, a tool that makes 
it easier and cheaper for employers to acquire applicant infor-
mation.
 
73 Even though the use of social media as an infor-
mation-gathering technique is increasing,74
 
 67. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, “Lifestyle” Discrimination in Em-
ployment, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 378, 407 (2003) (discussing the 
privacy impact of different methods of pre-employment research). 
 this new hiring 
practice has not met universal praise. In fact, distrust of social 
media in the hiring arena is abundant, evidenced by numerous 
 68. See, e.g., In re Pac. R.R. Comm’n, 32 F. 241 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887) (rec-
ognizing a citizen’s fundamental right to security from government inspection 
of physical items such as private books and papers). 
 69. 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding that the 
government violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting warrantless 
eavesdropping with an electronic listening device, because the defendant justi-
fiably relied upon the privacy of a public telephone booth). 
 70. See Ecker, supra note 29, at 274. 
 71. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350; Byrnside, supra note 3, at 452 (“Applicants 
 . . . often seek the ability to control their off-duty conduct regardless of a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.”). 
 72. Compare United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(holding that the use of a beeper to track an individual’s vehicular movements 
was not a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment), with Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (deciding that the use of a thermal imager to 
detect the heat emanating from the defendant’s home violated the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 73. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 453. 
 74. See id. 
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news articles expressing outrage over social media’s new role in 
pre-employment screening.75
B. THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
 Before detailing social media’s 
unique impact on pre-employment screening, it is necessary to 
review the history and characteristics of social media. 
Social media websites have exploded in popularity within 
the last several years, amassing millions of dedicated users.76 
Joining a social media community is easy. On Facebook, for ex-
ample, a user, armed with an e-mail address, a full name, and 
a birth date, is quickly able to access an online community that 
grows larger by the day.77 If Facebook were a country, it would 
be the third largest in the world, landing behind China and In-
dia but ahead of the United States.78 Facebook provides a tem-
plate into which a user, once registered, can enter virtually lim-
itless information: relationship status, schools attended, 
favorite movies, e-mail addresses, home addresses, and more.79 
Members may also post photos online with a “tag” that identi-
fies the people in the photo by name and adds the photo to 
those users’ personal profiles.80
The breadth of personal information uploaded to social 
media websites raises concerns over who can see what infor-
mation and when. While Facebook allows members to restrict 
the availability of the information posted online, the content is 
less private than many users believe.
  
81
 
 75. See, e.g., Alan Finder, For Some, Online Persona Undermines a Résu-
mé, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, at 1; Ken Rodriguez, Want a Job After Gradua-
tion? Don’t Reveal Your Wild Side Online, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 
5, 2006, at 3A.  
 Facebook’s default pri-
vacy settings are at a level intended to maximize visibility of 
user profiles and to increase privacy the user must sort through 
 76. See, e.g., Samantha L. Millier, Note, The Facebook Frontier: Respond-
ing to the Changing Face of Privacy on the Internet, 97 KY. L.J. 541, 544 
(2008).  
 77. As of July 21, 2010, 500 million users were registered on Facebook. 
Mark Zuckerberg, 500 Million Stories, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (July 21, 2010, 
9:23 AM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=409753352130. 
 78. See Brian Solis, Facebook Connects 500 Million People: Defines a New 
Era of Digital Society, BRIANSOLIS.COM (July 22, 2010), http://www.briansolis 
.com/2010/07/facebook-connects-500-million-people-defining-a-new-era-of 
-digital-society/. 
 79. Millier, supra note 76, at 544. 
 80. John Cassidy, Me Media: How Hanging Out on the Internet Became 
Big Business, NEW YORKER, May 15, 2006, at 50. 
 81. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 460–61.  
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somewhat complicated (not to mention constantly changing)82 
option menus.83 Privacy advocates are especially wary of Face-
book and other social media platforms.84 By making online con-
tent permanent and widespread, social media creates digital 
baggage that can be hard to escape.85 Furthermore, third par-
ties are free to post private and misleading information or im-
ages online without the user’s consent.86 In sum, Facebook us-
ers in particular, and social media users in general, have a 
false sense of security regarding the privacy of their social me-
dia profiles.87
The FTC is beginning to respond to these mounting con-
cerns. For example, Facebook and the FTC have recently final-
ized a settlement over deceptive practices related to privacy 
settings.
 
88 The settlement requires Facebook to agree to privacy 
audits for twenty years and will prohibit Facebook from mak-
ing public a piece of information that a user had originally 
shared privately on the site.89 Nonetheless, the actual impact of 
the deal is unclear. Jeff Chester, the executive director of the 
Center for Digital Democracy, warns that the FTC’s Facebook 
deal may only amount to “a tiny digital bump on the road that 
does nothing to derail [Facebook’s] voracious appetite to swal-
low up our data.”90
Employers have taken note of social media and its poten-
tial value as a hiring tool for precisely the same reasons that 
 
 
 82. See, e.g., The Evolution of Facebook Privacy, YALE J.L. & TECH. (Apr. 
21, 2011), http://www.yalelawtech.org/control-privacy-technology/evolution-of-
facebook-privacy/. 
 83. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 461. 
 84. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. 
REV. 61, 62 (2009) (arguing that social networking sites are breeding grounds 
for civil rights abuses). 
 85. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, 
AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 10–11 (2007) (advocating for a new system of 
privacy on the Internet in order to address the challenges of digital rumors, 
gossip, and shaming).  
 86. See Millier, supra note 76, at 545. 
 87. Ira Nathenson, Facebook: Job-Hunting, Non-Invisibility, and the 
Creepiness Factor, NATHENSON’S DIGITAL GARBAGE (June 12, 2006), 
http://digitalgarbage.net/2006/06/12/facebook/; see also Tim Armstrong, Social 
Darknets, INFO/LAW (June 12, 2006), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/ 
2006/06/12/social-Darknets/ (describing the mismatch between perceived pri-
vacy and the actual level of privacy enjoyed by social media users).  
 88. See Claire Cain Miller, F.T.C. Said to Be Near Facebook Privacy Deal, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2011, at B3. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. 
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applicants and the FTC raise privacy concerns about its use; 
social media makes large amounts of previously unobtainable 
personal data readily accessible.91 Indeed, social media “cre-
ate[s] huge new portals for the mass disclosure of private in-
formation.”92
C. SOCIAL MEDIA AS A PRE-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING TOOL  
 Thus, because of its novelty and informality, the 
use of social media in pre-employment screening escapes many 
of the regulations imposed on more traditional research tech-
niques.  
Companies are rapidly adding social media pre-
employment screening to their hiring playbooks. Tech giant 
Microsoft admits that “researching students through social 
networking sites [is] now fairly typical.”93 Likewise, according 
to a study conducted by CareerBuilder.com, about twelve per-
cent of hiring managers screen job candidates by searching pro-
files on social networking sites.94 The actual number of employ-
ers screening applicants over the Internet is probably higher, 
and sometimes large companies may not even be aware that 
those involved with hiring decisions are researching applicants 
online and factoring online information into their evaluations.95 
Even some professional associations are using social media dur-
ing background investigations. The Florida Bar Association 
Board of Bar Examiners visits Facebook and MySpace to inves-
tigate the “good moral character and fitness” status of bar ap-
plicants.96
 
 91. See Byrnside, supra note 
  
3, at 455.  
 92. Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship 
Privacy Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 
890 n.16 (2006).  
 93. Byrnside, supra note 3, at 456 (alteration in original) (citing Alan 
Finder, When a Risque Online Persona Undermines a Chance for a Job, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 2006, at 1). 
 94. See One-in-Four Hiring Managers Have Used Internet Search Engines 
to Screen Job Candidates; One-in-Ten Have Used Social Networking Sites, Ca-
reerBuilder.com Survey Finds, CAREERBUILDER.COM (Oct. 26, 2006), http:// 
www.careerbuilder.com/share/aboutus/pressreleases.aspx (follow “2006” hy-
perlink; then follow “10/26/2006” hyperlink).  
 95. See Michelle Sherman, Legal Issues Surrounding Social Media Back-
ground Checks, FCPA COMPLIANCE & ETHICS BLOG (Nov. 17, 2011, 1:13 AM), 
http://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2011/11/17/. 
 96. See Jan Pudlow, On Facebook? FBBE May Be Planning a Visit, THE 
FLA. BAR NEWS (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/ 
jnnews01.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa900624829/d288355844fc8c728525761
900652232?OpenDocument. 
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Unlike credit reports or criminal history background 
checks, employers usually research an applicant’s social media 
profile without seeking the assistance of a third-party reporting 
company.97 Employers run quick social media searches from a 
company or personal computer in hopes of finding informative 
online content.98 But since September 2010, some employers 
across the nation are contracting with third-parties, like Social 
Intelligence, to institute formalized social media background 
checks.99 The effect of this new development is significant: 
third-party reporting agencies must comply with the FCRA 
when performing social media research.100 However, it is clear 
that many employers—if not most—continue to conduct infor-
mal social media screens.101
As a consequence of social media’s popularity and accessi-
bility, one might think that most job applicants would choose to 
remove, or not post, provocative online information that could 
reach an employer.
  
102 Numerous stories indicate otherwise. For 
example, one eager job applicant failed to receive an offer after 
being linked to an online advertisement seeking OxyContin.103 
Similarly, after discovering that an applicant’s Facebook profile 
included interests such as “‘smokin’ blunts’ . . . shooting people 
and obsessive sex,” one employer removed an otherwise quali-
fied applicant from consideration.104 Even if such online behav-
ior is in jest and taken out of context, employers are unlikely to 
hire an individual who demonstrates poor judgment online.105
Although job applicants themselves are frequently to 
blame for the harmful online material that influences an em-
ployer’s hiring decision, the accuracy, authenticity and rele-
vance of online content is suspect,
  
106
 
 97. See Byrnside, supra note 
 particularly because photo 
3, at 457 (positing that the majority of em-
ployers do not use formal means to research an applicant’s online behavior). 
 98. See Melissa Bell, More Employers Using Firms that Check Applicants’ 
Social Media History, WASH. POST, July 15, 2011, at C1 (discussing generally 
the ease with which employers can find details of applicants online). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See Mithal, supra note 15, at 1. 
 101. See Bell, supra note 98. 
 102. See Millier, supra note 76, at 542–43 (discussing the problem by which 
“the desire to share information with one’s friends may also expose users to 
unknown third parties who may misuse their information”). 
 103. Preston, supra note 1, at B1.  
 104. Finder, supra note 75, at 1. 
 105. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 473–74. 
 106. See id. at 470–71. 
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editing tools and hacking problems are ubiquitous.107
II.  THE UTILITY OF EXISTING REGULATORY SCHEMES 
AS APPLIED TO IN-HOUSE SOCIAL MEDIA PRE-
EMPLOYEMENT SCREENING   
 In light of 
these concerns, together with the uniqueness and usefulness of 
social media from an employer’s perspective, the question  
arises: is there a legal framework that can adequately regulate 
social media pre-employment screening? 
The unique features of social media pre-employment 
screening make its use cumbersome to regulate under existing 
laws.108 Unlike its predecessors, most social media pre-
employment screening is performed in-house without third-
party assistance.109 Furthermore, social media screening is 
quick, convenient and anonymous. As a result, many employ-
ment attorneys conclude that there is nothing illegal about em-
ployers using social networking sites to research applicants.110 
And since a case has yet to arise that suggests otherwise, the 
potential liability risks to employers who use social media to 
screen applicants appear to be low.111
A. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF TITLE VII AND THE ADA 
 Simply put, Title VII, the 
ADA, state statutes, the Fourth Amendment, and the FCRA do 
not adequately impose restrictions, or the threat of liability, on 
employers who informally screen job applicants with social me-
dia. These deficiencies, however, do not warrant wholesale 
abandonment of the regulatory principles that control tradi-
tional pre-employment screening practices. In particular, the 
Fourth Amendment and the FCRA promote useful notions of 
limited online privacy and notice that should be applied to so-
cial media pre-employment research. 
An employer that refuses to hire an applicant due to the 
candidate’s protected class status may violate the anti-
 
 107. See Ian Lovett & Adam Nagourney, Arrest Is Made in Hacking of Ce-
lebrities’ Private E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, at A20 (reporting that all 
computer users are vulnerable to hacker attack).  
 108. See Corey M. Dennis, Legal Implications of Employee Social Media 
Use, 93 MASS. L. REV. 380, 381–92 (2011) (discussing the risk of liability from 
invasion of privacy and discrimination claims).  
 109. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 457.  
 110. Hiring: Pitfalls of Checking Job Applicants’ Personal Web Pages, 
MANAGING ACCOUNTS PAYABLE, Oct. 2006, at 4, 5.  
 111. See Dennis, supra note 108, at 381 (acknowledging that the primary 
liability risk is from employment discrimination lawsuits). 
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discrimination principles of Title VII and the ADA. As indicat-
ed above, Title VII and the ADA forbid discrimination based on 
an applicant’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or disa-
bility.112 Social media profiles regularly display such sensitive 
information, in addition to other intimate details of users’ pri-
vate lives.113 The availability of this information online does not 
necessarily lead to discrimination—only adverse employment 
decisions based on an applicant’s social media profile could re-
sult in discrimination claims—but social media does provide 
employers a chance to access information they would otherwise 
not be privy to and certainly would be unable to ask about dur-
ing a job interview.114
If an employer used social media to ascertain applicants’ 
membership in a protected class and subsequently used that 
information to systematically remove certain applicants from 
employment consideration, the employer would risk liability for 
discrimination.
 
115 Assuming a claimant could provide documen-
tation of the discriminatory practice, Title VII and the ADA 
would proscribe that sort of social media pre-employment 
screening.116 Other discriminatory use of social media pre-
employment screening could also implicate Title VII and the 
ADA—for example, if an employer only viewed the social media 
profiles of certain types of applicants, or if it viewed some social 
media content with a discriminatory lens.117
But Title VII and the ADA only go so far. The type of per-
sonal or misleading information collected by social media pre-
employment screening is usually unrelated to race, religion, 
sex, disability, or any other protected class.
  
118
 
 112. See supra discussion at Part I.A.1. 
 Employers turn 
to social media in an effort to learn all manners of personal in-
formation, “including drinking habits, nudity, general sleazi-
ness, and criminal behavior ranging from shoplifting to violent 
 113. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 462–63 (noting that users’ sexual orien-
tation, political affiliation, age, and marital status are commonly viewable on 
social media profiles). 
 114. See id. 
 115. See Ed Frauenheim, Caution Advised When Using Social Networking 
Web Sites for Recruiting, Background Checking, WORKFORCE MGMT. ONLINE 
(Nov. 2006), http://www.workforce.com/section/06/feature/24/58/49/245851.html. 
 116. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 463–64 (using the example of an em-
ployer who only looks at the profiles of African Americans and women).  
 117. See id. 
 118. See Dennis, supra note 108, at 381. 
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assaults.”119 It is exactly this kind of personal information that 
applicants argue should be excluded from pre-employment re-
search.120 Applicants want the freedom to express themselves 
online without fear that employers may find this information 
and then use it to make hiring decisions.121 Applicants further 
contend that an employer’s hiring decision should come down to 
who is best qualified for the job, not the applicant whose life-
style choices resonate with, or least offend, an employer.122 
While anti-discrimination statutes play an important role in 
ensuring that social media sites are not used as an unfair hir-
ing tool, Title VII and the ADA do not address the biggest prob-
lems of social media screening—authenticity, accuracy, and 
relevance.123 Under both Title VII and the ADA, it appears to be 
perfectly legal for an employer to methodically exclude appli-
cants with drunken or provocative photos on their social media 
pages.124
B. STATE STATUTES REGULATING BACKGROUND CHECKS ARE 
LIMITED IN APPLICATION 
  
Adding to the protections of Title VII and the ADA, most 
states have enacted statutes that restrict or prohibit employers’ 
inquires about an applicant’s arrest record.125 State legislatures 
were worried that even though an arrest is not an indication of 
guilt, employers would unfairly disqualify those applicants 
with arrest records.126
 
 119. LaJean Humphries, The Impact of Social Networking Tools and 
Guidelines to Use Them, LLRX.COM (Jan. 15, 2007), http://www.llrx.com/ 
features/goodgoogle.htm. 
 On its face, social media screening shares 
many of the negative aspects inherent in employers’ use of ar-
rest records, as online content may be highly prejudicial and 
 120. Cf. Finder, supra note 75, at 3 (discussing students’ views that the 
“adult world” does not know about social media sites such as Facebook).  
 121. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 472. 
 122. See Dennis, supra note 108, at 382 (arguing that reference checks, in-
terviews and more traditional background screening will satisfy most employ-
ers’ need to hire the best candidate). 
 123. See, e.g., id. (“[O]n social networking sites and blogs, destructive 
groups have published lies and doctored photographs of vulnerable individu-
als, sent damaging statements about victims to employers, and manipulated 
search engines to highlight those statements for business associates and cli-
ents to see.”). 
 124. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 465. 
 125. See supra discussion at Part I.A.2. 
 126. See Ecker, supra note 29, at 255. 
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entirely unrelated to an applicant’s ability to perform job du-
ties.127
Regardless of the similarities, state statutes pertaining to 
arrest records are not an appropriate foundation for regulating 
social media pre-employment screening. First, these state stat-
utes are situation specific and do not provide a broad privacy or 
accuracy principle that can be applied to other forms of back-
ground research.
  
128 Even assuming that social media are the 
kinds of public records that states occasionally regulate, state 
statutes only limit access in predefined areas.129 Indeed, the 
majority of public records are unrestricted.130
Additionally, expanding state regulations to include social 
media pre-employment screening ignores the advantages of a 
national policy. A strong national policy regarding social media 
background checks is preferable over widely differing state 
public record regimes because a national policy would create a 
minimum level of privacy protection.
  
131 A uniform privacy base-
line increases the likelihood that applicants would know about 
their privacy rights, and likewise, that users of restricted in-
formation would know the responsibilities that accompany 
their access to such information.132 Therefore, a federal baseline 
must be established; states would be free to adopt stricter pro-
tections of privacy, but a federal program “must provide a 
meaningful floor of protection.”133
C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROVIDES HELPFUL PRINCIPLES, 
BUT CASE LAW PREVENTS ITS APPLICATION TO SOCIAL MEDIA 
PRE-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING  
 While admirable in purpose, 
state statutes restricting employers’ use of arrest records are 
not fully responsive to social media screening. 
Despite its frequent invocation, a Fourth Amendment in-
vasion of privacy claim corresponding to employers’ use of so-
cial media to screen applicants is unlikely to succeed. As a 
threshold matter: “[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be trans-
 
 127. See Dennis, supra note 108, at 381–82. 
 128. See Solove, supra note 46, 1169–70. 
 129. See id. (discussing context-dependent state statutes that restrict ac-
cess to motor vehicle, accident, traffic citations, voter, and arrest records). 
 130. See id. 
 131. Cf. id. at 1200 (preferring a national over a state regulatory system for 
public records as technological advances increase the digitization of public 
documents).  
 132. See id. 
 133. Id. 
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lated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’ That 
Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds 
of governmental intrusion . . . .”134
Further limiting an applicant’s Fourth Amendment claim 
arising from social media pre-employment screening is the rule 
that a claimant must have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in order to bring suit.
 It follows that the Fourth 
Amendment cannot adequately regulate social media pre-
employment screening since a substantial portion of employ-
ers—private employers—would elude its protections. 
135 Critically, courts often consider infor-
mation available online to be in the public domain,136 and “the 
rule of thumb is: If it’s in the public domain, it’s fair game.”137 
In other words, existing precedent indicates that a person who 
willingly posts personal information to a social media site lacks 
a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding that infor-
mation.138 In rare circumstances, however, an applicant might 
be able to assert a credible invasion of privacy claim against a 
government employer. For example, an applicant may have a 
strong invasion of privacy claim if the employer hacks past the 
privacy settings on an applicant’s social media page, or if a 
third party unlawfully posted private information online.139 But 
even stringent privacy settings do not guarantee a successful 
invasion of privacy claim following a breach. It would be “tough 
to prove that this expectation of limited access, even if reasona-
ble, is an expectation of ‘privacy.’”140
 
 134. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (emphasis added). 
 
 135. See supra discussion at Part I.A.4. 
 136. See Michael Whiteman, The Impact of the Internet and Other Electron-
ic Sources on an Attorney’s Duty of Competence Under the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 89, 97 (2000) (discussing the availability of 
new legal developments that can be found online in considering whether to 
reprimand attorneys for professional conduct violations). 
 137. Martha Irvine, Privacy Becomes Concern as Social Media Online Sites 
Become Fair Game, USA TODAY (Dec. 30, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
tech/news/2006-12-30-privacy-online_x.htm. 
 138. See generally John. S. Ganz, Comment, It’s Already Public: Why Fed-
eral Officers Should Not Need Warrants to Use GPS Vehicle Tracking Devices, 
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1325, 1333–34 (2005) (finding existing prece-
dent to be critical of invasion of privacy claims that are based on publicly ob-
servable and voluntarily exposed information). 
 139. See George Lenard, Employers Using Facebook for Background Check-
ing, Part I, GEORGE’S EMP’T BLAWG (Dec. 6, 2006), http://www 
.employmentblawg.com/2006/employers-using-facebook-for-background-
checking-part-i/. 
 140. Id. 
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While the Fourth Amendment’s direct extension to social 
media pre-employment screening is untenable, recent Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence does provide a useful framework for 
thinking about privacy on the Internet. In the landmark deci-
sion United States v. Maynard, the court applied a “mosaic the-
ory” to rule that prolonged and warrantless GPS vehicular sur-
veillance amounted to a search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.141 The court recognized a reasonable expectation 
of privacy regarding the totality of one’s movements on public 
streets, even though isolated outings are publicly exposed.142 
For the court, a reasonable person expects that each public 
movement will remain “disconnected and anonymous.”143 Since 
Maynard, the mosaic theory has received praise in some circles 
for elegantly accommodating an expectation of privacy in some 
public activity.144
Building on the Maynard precedent, several scholars sug-
gest that personal information, while public to an extent when 
posted on the Internet, demands some level of privacy protec-
tion. According to Professor Daniel J. Solove: 
 
Privacy involves an expectation of a certain degree of accessibility of 
information . . . . [P]rivacy entails control over and limitations on cer-
tain uses of information, even if the information is not concealed. Pri-
vacy can be violated by altering levels of accessibility, by taking ob-
scure facts and making them widely accessible . . . . 
  We know that our lives will remain private not in the sense that 
the information will be completely shielded from public access, but in 
the sense that for the most part, it will be lost in a sea of information 
about millions of people. Our personal information remains private 
because it is a needle in a haystack, and usually nobody will take the 
time to try to find it.145
However, the fact remains that only a few courts, in lim-
ited situations, have been willing to abandon the public versus 
 
 
 141. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in 
part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). Since the U.S. 
Supreme Court affirmed the Maynard decision on slightly different grounds, 
the lasting impact of the mosaic theory remains to be seen. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 563 (quoting Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 572 
(1970) (Breitel, J., concurring)). 
 144. See, e.g., Bethany L. Dickman, Note, Untying Knotts: The Application 
of Mosaic Theory to GPS Surveillance in United States v. Maynard, 60 AM. U. 
L. REV. 731, 738 (2011). 
 145. Solove, supra note 46, at 1178. Contra Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 
N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (“[W]hen Plaintiff created her Facebook 
and MySpace accounts, she consented to the fact that her personal infor-
mation would be shared with others.”). 
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private dichotomy that defeats a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy if the contested information is disclosed publicly.146
D. THE FCRA: A WORKABLE BUT INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR 
REGULATING SOCIAL MEDIA’S PROMINENCE IN HIRING 
DECISIONS 
 Still, 
the novel efforts by some courts to include seemingly public in-
formation under the Fourth Amendment legitimize the regula-
tion of social media pre-employment screening. Sure, social 
media sites are in the public domain, but their use—especially 
by employers—should not be without limits.  
As argued above, social media pre-employment screening 
should be regulated not with the goal of preventing it, but rath-
er to control accessibility and ensure authenticity, accuracy, 
and relevance.147 To that end, the FCRA contains the procedur-
al requirements necessary to regulate social media pre-
employment screening in a manner that responds to the priva-
cy values expressed in recent Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. Under the FCRA, an employer must (1) receive an appli-
cant’s permission before a background check is conducted and 
(2) notify the applicant if an adverse employment decision is 
based on the background check.148
First, by requiring prior approval, the FCRA ensures that 
applicants will not be surprised when an employer views social 
media content. Relatedly, prior approval gives the applicant an 
opportunity to clean up potentially misleading information, 
 Applying these requirements 
to social media pre-employment screening sufficiently protects 
applicants’ privacy interests without unduly harming employ-
ers’ “best fit” concerns. 
 
 146. See Solove, supra note 46, at 1181–82. Compare Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp. 
of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488, 502 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that plaintiffs 
did not waive their right to keep their participation in a medical program pri-
vate by attending a party for those involved in the program), and Sanders v. 
Am. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1999) (recognizing a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in workplace discussions with coworkers even though others 
could overhear the conversations), with Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 
N.E.2d 765, 770 (N.Y. 1970) (ruling that personal information already dis-
closed to others could hardly be considered private despite the fact that it had 
been shared with select persons only), and Fisher v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & 
Corr., 578 N.E.2d 901, 902 (Ohio Misc. 2d 1988) (determining that a plaintiff 
who told four coworkers that some interactions between herself and her young 
son had “sexual overtones” could claim no reasonable expectation of privacy as 
to her statements). 
 147. See supra discussion at Part II.C. 
 148. See supra text accompanying notes 50–53. 
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prepare explanations regarding suspicious material or increase 
privacy settings on particular content. If “claims that employ-
ers are invading applicants’ privacy by looking at their social 
networking profiles [are] the most common,”149
Second, by requiring notice for adverse decisions based on 
a social media pre-employment screen, the FCRA affords an 
applicant another opportunity to correct or remove damaging 
online content. It may be easy to blame an applicant for sexual-
ly explicit photos posted on the Internet, but as more people 
post content online and do so at a much younger age, a dispar-
aging comment or activity could be essentially forgotten until 
uncovered by the employer. As noted by attorney Ian Byrnside, 
“[w]here youthful indiscretions were once easily forgotten with 
the passage of time, today’s youth and their indiscretions ‘can 
be preserved in perpetuity’ for all to see.”
 then giving an 
applicant notice rewards the attentive applicant and dissoci-
ates social media pre-employment screening from a form of 
online spying. 
150
Compared to other regulatory options, it is unlikely that 
employers would be unduly burdened by FCRA-regulated social 
media pre-employment research. Instead of completely banning 
social media from playing a role in hiring decisions, the FCRA 
would allow employers to access pertinent online content as it 
relates to future job performance.
 Furthermore, this 
disclosure would create a formalized record of the online con-
tent, a potentially useful tool in Title VII or ADA litigation. 
151 The FCRA gives employers 
a choice: conduct social media research the right way—in a way 
that actually maximizes legally permissible applicant data—or 
not at all. Undoubtedly, contracting with a third party to con-
duct social media screens would be more expensive and would 
require more planning than in-house research, but it is possible 
that the efficiency gains due to a condensed and relevant third-
party report would more than make up for the employer’s mon-
etary investment.152
 
 149. Byrnside, supra note 
 Employers could also prioritize which va-
cant positions were important enough to require social media 
3, at 461. 
 150. Id. at 476 (quoting Your Resume May Be Overshadowed by Your 
Online Persona, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE (July 9, 2006), http://web 
.archive.org/web/20110708005601/https://www.privacyrights.org/print/ar/Onli
nePersona.htm). 
 151. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (2006). 
 152. For Social Intelligence’s list of the advantages of third-party reporting, 
see SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE, http://www.socialintel.com (last visited Oct. 18, 
2012). 
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screening. And if all employers used third-party reports, a 
market would be created in which third-party reporting agen-
cies would compete with each other for business, resulting in 
better services at lower prices.153
Unfortunately, the FCRA’s significant merits do not 
change the fact that much of social media pre-employment 
screening is conducted by the employer, not a third-party 
screening company. No complex statistical formulas or detailed 
comparison factors are needed to understand an applicant’s so-
cial media page.
  
154 Unless Facebook and similar social media 
websites revert back to a college-only admissions policy, an in-
credibly unlikely occurrence considering the success of expand-
ed membership programs,155 employers are not forced to go 
through third-party organizations to obtain social media con-
tent. And since the FCRA only impacts background research 
conducted by a third-party “consumer reporting agency,” in-
house research need not be FCRA compliant.156 Thus, the em-
ployer does not have a legal duty to obtain permission prior to 
an investigation, provide notice of negative online information, 
or investigate potential errors and correct misinformation.157
However, the missing link capable of placing social media 
pre-employment screening under the FCRA umbrella is now a 
reality. Third-party social media screening and the correspond-
ing FCRA compliance, provided by companies like Social Intel-
ligence, is on the rise. That is a good thing for applicants. Still, 
employer participation in third-party screening is lacking, il-
lustrating the need for FCRA tweaking.  
  
 
 153. See Hon. Richard D. Cudahy & Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 59, 101–02 (2010) (“[P]erfect competition yields allocative and 
productive efficiency in the long run, while monopoly results in deadweight 
loss and wealth transfers.”). 
 154. See Building a Better Credit Report, supra note 51, at 3. 
 155. See Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Expands to Include Work 
Networks (May 3, 2006), available at http://newsroom.fb.com/News/Facebook-
Expands-to-Include-Work-Networks-d9.aspx. 
 156. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(f ) (2006). 
 157. Your Resume May Be Overshadowed by Your Online Persona, PRIVACY 
RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE (July 9, 2006), http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20110708005601/https://www.privacyrights.org/print/ar/OnlinePersona.htm. 
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III.  THE FCRA AND THIRD-PARTY REPORTING: A FAIR 
WAY TO REGULATE SOCIAL MEDIA BACKGROUND 
CHECKS   
Until very recently, social media pre-employment screen-
ing occurred in-house instead of through a third-party report-
ing agency.158 Although employers regularly turned to third-
party reporting agencies for criminal background checks or 
credit reports, the accessibility of social media encouraged em-
ployers to perform their own Internet research. To address the 
privacy implications of in-house social media research, previous 
scholarship advocated a “grandmother rule,” where social me-
dia users would only post online content they would be com-
fortable sharing with their grandmas.159 Likewise, employers 
were encouraged to forgive online youthful transgressions, or 
alternatively, merely avoid violating the restrictions of Title 
VII, the ADA, state statutes, and the Fourth Amendment when 
using social media.160
But now, employers have the option to hire third parties to 
conduct social media pre-employment research. Since the FTC 
mandated that third-party social media screens must comply 
with the FCRA, all of the privacy and notice advantages of 
FCRA regulated pre-employment research (like credit reports) 
can be applied to the social media context. Nonetheless, simply 
the option to use third-party social media screening is not 
enough to protect applicant privacy or to ensure that employers 
will enjoy the advantages of third-party screening. If social me-
dia is to be considered during pre-employment evaluation, em-
ployers must be required to use third parties. Therefore, the 
FCRA should be amended to expressly prohibit in-house social 
media research. Like with other violations of the FCRA, a suc-
cessful claimant should be permitted to recover damages from 
an employer who conducts in-house social media screens. 
 Until a judicial or legislative decision was 
made regarding employers’ use of social media in the hiring 
process, these solutions largely relied on the goodwill of em-
ployers to protect applicant data, a steep request considering 
the ease of online research. 
 
 158. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 465–66. 
 159. See, e.g., id. at 474. 
 160. See, e.g., id. at 474–76. 
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A. THIRD-PARTY SOCIAL MEDIA REPORTS WOULD PROTECT 
APPLICANT PRIVACY 
As explained above, the FCRA has the potential to nicely 
regulate social media pre-employment screening by restricting, 
rather than prohibiting, Internet research.161 FCRA-compliant 
social media screening puts the applicant on notice, giving him 
or her ample time to increase privacy settings, remove mislead-
ing information, or prepare explanations for suspicious online 
content.162 Furthermore, it eliminates the guesswork from so-
cial media screening. No longer will applicants be forced to 
wonder whether it was their qualifications or spring break pic-
ture that removed them from job consideration. Any impact 
that social media pre-employment screening has on an em-
ployment decision must be reported to the applicant. This 
transparency decreases the likelihood of Title VII or ADA viola-
tions and allows an applicant to take remedial measures.163
At the same time, third-party social media reporting does 
not substantially harm employers. Personal information on the 
Internet is abundant, but as spokeswoman for the Society for 
Human Resource Management Jen Jorgensen correctly recog-
nizes, “[j]ust because the information’s out there doesn’t mean 
it’s useful.”
  
164 Third-party reporting agencies can present em-
ployers with applicant information that is job-related and those 
agencies can remove sensitive information that could lead to 
disparate impact claims.165 Additionally, because the FCRA im-
poses a duty to report accurate information, the likelihood that 
false or misleading social media content influences an employ-
er’s decision-making process will be reduced.166
For some employers, however, even the benefits of more re-
liable social media data may pale in comparison to the costs of 
third-party social media reporting. Given that there are cur-
rently few legal risks associated with in-house social media 
 Familiarity with 
social media should allow third-party reporting agencies to bet-
ter detect when particular content is the result of high-tech 
sabotage. 
 
 161. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
 162. See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text. 
 163. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 469–70. 
 164. Id. at 470 (citing H.J. Cummins, Bosses Peek in on Web Site for Stu-
dents, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 3, 2006, at D1). 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. at 471. 
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screening,167 employers may be reluctant to give up in-house re-
search for third-party social media screening. Yet these com-
plaints fail to recognize that regulating social media pre-
employment research with the FCRA would not require em-
ployers to hire third-party reporting agencies.168 Employers 
would be free to forego social media research if the expense of 
third-party reporting were too great. And all of the traditional 
pre-employment screening tools—interviews, reference checks, 
criminal history reports—would still be available at little ex-
pense to the employer.169
In addition to the benefits of FCRA compliant third-party 
social media research from an applicant’s perspective—and its 
minor impact on employers—third-party social media screening 
is also consistent with the purpose of the FCRA. Congress en-
acted the FCRA to prevent “needless intrusion into consumer 
privacy” and to “ensure that this country’s consumer reporting 
system would function . . . accurately.”
 The substantial privacy interests im-
plicated by in-house social media research outweigh the costs 
incurred by employers if they choose to pursue third-party so-
cial media pre-employment screening. 
170
Privacy commentators are beginning to take note of the 
advantages of third-party social media pre-employment screen-
ing. To test the third-party reporting process, Mat Honan, a 
 Third-party reporting 
balances those legislative interests—it filters out irrelevant ap-
plicant information, it notifies the candidate of an employer’s 
intention to conduct research over the Internet, and it provides 
the employer with accurate data. Social media’s prominent role 
in hiring decisions was surely beyond the anticipation of Con-
gress when the FCRA was first passed, but third-party social 
media screening is consistent with the fairness guidelines of 
the FCRA. Finally, it is important to note that the broad lan-
guage and purpose of the FCRA provides a malleable legal 
standard that is able to keep pace with technological advance-
ments. After all, future pre-employment screening practices 
will likely involve the Internet, but whether Facebook and 
Twitter will still be useful is anyone’s guess.  
 
 167. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra discussion at Part II.D. 
 169. Cf. Befort, supra note 9, at 415–16 (noting that several traditional pre-
employment screening techniques are not overly expensive). 
 170. Fair Credit Reporting Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer 
Affairs and Coinage of the Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 102d 
Cong. 20 (1991) (statement of David Medine, Associate Director for Credit 
Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n). 
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writer for the tech blog Gizmodo, along with five other Gizmodo 
employees, underwent a social media screen conducted by So-
cial Intelligence.171 The five others passed, but Mr. Honan’s 
screen was more troublesome; online information revealed his 
previous proclivity for cocaine and LSD.172 Despite the results, 
Mr. Honan concluded that “these kind of [third-party reporting] 
services actually make a lot of sense. . . . [I]t’s better for both 
the employer and the candidate to have a disinterested third-
party do full-scrape background checks.”173 Plus, the procedure 
may not be as invasive as one might think.174 Anything that 
could be considered discriminatory or irrelevant in a job search 
was removed from Social Intelligence’s final report.175
Nevertheless, third-party social media screening elicits 
comparisons to Big Brother.
  
176 A fear that mostly innocent In-
ternet activity, including “bawdy jokes” or “slightly irreverent” 
photos,177 will unfairly prevent qualified applicants from secur-
ing jobs drives much of the opposition to third-party social me-
dia reporting. Privacy-focused senators Al Franken and Rich-
ard Blumenthal recently wrote Social Intelligence to voice their 
concerns about “numerous scenarios under which a job appli-
cant could be unfairly harmed by the information [Social Intel-
ligence] . . . provides to an employer.”178
 
 171. See Mat Honan, I Flunked My Social Media Background Check. Will 
You?, GIZMODO (July 7, 2011, 2:13 PM), 
 While well-intentioned, 
these criticisms miss the point. Employers, with or without dis-
interested third-party assistance, will research job applicants 
online. But by turning to companies like Social Intelligence, 
employers actually agree to submit to the fairness and accuracy 
requirements of the FCRA. As Mr. Honan points out, “[a]s an 
http://gizmodo.com/5818774/this-is-a-
social-media-background-check. 
 172. See id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Bell, supra note 98. 
 175. See Honan, supra note 171. 
 176. See, e.g., “Social Intelligence” Receives FTC Approval to Archive Face-
book Posts for Job Screening Purposes, FACECROOKS (June 22, 2011, 8:15 AM), 
http://facecrooks.com/Internet-Safety-Privacy/&E2%80%9CSocial-Intelligence 
%E2%80%9D-receives-FTC-approval-to-archive-Facebook-posts-for-Job-
Screening-Purposes.html.  
 177. Id.  
 178. Letter from Sen. Al Franken & Sen. Richard Blumenthal, to Max 
Drucker, Chief Exec. Officer, Social Intelligence Corp. (Sept. 19, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.norwalkplus.com/nwk/information/nwsnwk/publish/News_1/ 
Blumenthal-Franken-quiz-Social-Intelligence-Corp-on-practices_np_14566 
.shtml.  
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employee, you don’t want potential employers knowing certain 
things about you that might make you a less attractive candi-
date due to their personal biases. As an employer, even if none 
of those things matter, just accidentally finding them out can 
be a problem.”179
Questions regarding the privacy benefits of third-party so-
cial media pre-employment screening endure, perhaps because 
of the discomfort that typically attaches to new hiring practic-
es.
 Third-party social media reporting allows a 
neutral entity to determine what online content is appropriate 
during hiring considerations. 
180 Amidst this contentious environment, the FTC approved 
Social Intelligence’s reporting practices as consistent with the 
FCRA.181 After determining that Social Intelligence was indeed 
a consumer reporting agency under the FCRA, the FTC 
dropped its investigation into Social Intelligence’s practices and 
thereby tacitly endorsed Social Intelligence’s screening meth-
ods.182
The FTC’s approval of Social Intelligence should increase 
employers’ comfort with third-party social media reporting.
 As long as the FTC continues to monitor the activities of 
Social Intelligence and other third-party screening companies, 
their implicit approval of third-party reporting is reasonable 
and actually respects applicant privacy. 
183
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR MANDATING THIRD-PARTY SOCIAL MEDIA 
REPORTS  
 
However, in order for the real benefits of third-party social me-
dia screening to be realized, more than just a handful of em-
ployers must seek the assistance of outside vendors.  
For the FCRA to have any force, employers that desire ap-
plicants’ social media information must be required to hire 
third-parties to conduct their social media pre-employment 
screening. While the benefits of third-party social media report-
ing may incentivize some employers to forego in-house Internet 
research,184
 
 179. See Honan, supra note 
 the additional expense may be enough to dissuade 
171. 
 180. See Kashmir Hill, Senators Worried Job Seekers ‘Unfairly Harmed’ by 
Social Media Background Checks, FORBES.COM (Sept. 20, 2011, 3:31 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/09/20/senators-worried-job-
seekers-unfairly-harmed-by-social-media-background-checks/. 
 181. See Mithal, supra note 15, at 2. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See Sherman, supra note 95. 
 184. See discussion supra Part II.D.  
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many others. Therefore, the FCRA should be expanded to pro-
hibit in-house social media research, federal agencies should 
strictly enforce third-party social media reporting, and employ-
ers should implement policies that prohibit internal screening. 
Perhaps the best place to add a restriction on social media 
research would be in § 1681b of the FCRA since it deals with 
the permissible purpose of consumer reports. Following the dis-
cussion of the conditions for furnishing and using consumer re-
ports for employment purposes,185
To add teeth to this proposed amendment, appropriate fed-
eral agencies must support properly conducted third-party so-
cial media reporting. By dropping its investigation of Social In-
telligence, the FTC legitimized third-party social media 
screening.
 clear language—mirroring 
the existing style of the FCRA—should be inserted that states: 
“Due to the increasing amount of personal data present on the 
Internet, there is a need to protect the consumer’s right to pri-
vacy regarding such information. Subject to the requirements 
of this title, employers seeking information regarding a con-
sumer’s Internet presence, including, but not limited to, a con-
sumer’s social media activities, shall exclusively rely on con-
sumer reporting agencies to supply such information.” Obvious 
interpretation challenges would arise because of the terms “In-
ternet presence” and “social media activities.” Confusion could 
be mitigated by FTC guidance, however, and modifications to 
this proposed statutory amendment would be more than wel-
come. Political pressures, expert testimony, and enforcement 
feasibility would likely impact the language of the final 
amendment. What is important, though, is that employers are 
clearly prohibited from conducting in-house social media re-
search, and held liable for noncompliance under § 1681n of the 
FCRA. 
186 More is needed. The FTC must not only regulate 
third-party reporting agencies, but it must also ensure that 
employers are discontinuing their reliance on informal social 
media searches. To do so, in accordance with its regulatory au-
thority,187
 
 185. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2006). 
 the FTC should regularly investigate employers that 
perform in-house social media research. When appropriate, the 
existence of an investigation should be identified in a press re-
lease. Additionally, the FTC should create and enforce harsh 
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 153–55. 
 187. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
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penalties for businesses that continue to informally mine social 
media for applicant data.188
The EEOC should partner with the FTC to address the 
problem of employers avoiding FCRA compliance by conducting 
informal social media research. Through its outreach, educa-
tion, and technical assistance programs, the EEOC should 
highlight the benefits of third-party Internet screening. This 
support should not equal blind endorsement. Rather, the EEOC 
and FTC should recognize that third-party reporting that is 
compliant with the FCRA is the better alternative to in-house 
social media research.  
 
Employers should take an active role too. Adopting an in-
ternal policy that prohibits in-house social media screening is a 
critical first step toward mandating third-party social media 
reporting. By incorporating a social media policy into an ethics 
and compliance program, employers can ensure that current 
employees involved in hiring decisions do not give in to the 
temptation to conduct informal Internet research.189
Admittedly, informal use of social media is difficult to com-
pletely separate from hiring decisions. Even the staunchest ad-
vocate of third-party reporting may have a personal Facebook 
account that allows incidental contact with an applicant. 
Googling an applicant is unlikely to disappear. Ultimately, it is 
up to the applicant to make sure that all sensitive material is 
protected. And of course, states may impose tighter restrictions 
on social media reporting than those supplied by the FCRA. 
But in combination with third-party reporting, the FCRA works 
where other regulations have not, it already exists and it bal-
ances the competing interest involved in social media pre-
employment screening. Why reinvent the wheel? 
 And be-
cause employees cannot “un-see” content posted to social media 
pages—perhaps giving irrelevant information relevance during 
a hiring decision—employers should firmly prohibit in-house 
social media research. 
CONCLUSION 
The emergence of social media provides employers an op-
portunity to research applicants online. Due to low privacy set-
tings and easy accessibility, employers routinely view appli-
cants’ social media pages during the hiring process. This upsets 
 
 188. See id. 
 189. See Sherman, supra note 95. 
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many job applicants. Even though such material is somewhat 
public, social media users are uncomfortable with the idea that 
online content that is possibly false, misleading, or irrelevant 
will play a role during hiring decisions. Previous efforts to con-
trol social media pre-employment screening and protect appli-
cant privacy focused on Title VII, the ADA and the Fourth 
Amendment. However, these efforts were largely unsatisfacto-
ry. So long as employers did not violate a specific law, they had 
significant leeway to conduct social media research. 
Beginning in 2010, third parties started offering to screen 
applicants online for interested employers. Third-party social 
media pre-employment screens are subject to the fairness con-
straints of the FCRA, and therefore they are a better solution 
to the privacy interests implicated by social media research. 
The FCRA requires applicant permission before a pre-
employment screen may begin, gives an applicant notice of ad-
verse decisions based on social media, and allows applicants to 
take remedial measures if their social media content is getting 
in the way of job opportunities. FCRA compliant third-party 
screens also ensure that employers receive only job-related in-
formation, adding efficiency to the hiring process. Consequent-
ly, the FCRA should be amended to require all employers inter-
ested in using social media to evaluate job applicants to use 
third-party screening companies. The FTC and the EEOC 
should be the primary parties responsible for enforcing employ-
ers’ commitment to third-party social media pre-employment 
screening.  
 
